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1 
A Dyad Model of Calling Behaviour with Tie Strength Dynamics 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the dynamic relation between callers‟ social ties and their wireless phone 
service consumption.  We construct a large pair-level panel dataset with information on the 
number of each pair‟s common contacts, calling activities, prices, and each caller‟s 
characteristics over a one-year time period.  We estimate a dynamic model that encapsulates the 
evolving relationship between each pair of consumers.  We find the amount of communications 
between a pair of consumers increases with the strength of their tie, which is higher when these 
two consumers share more common contacts.  Our results support the reciprocity rule in 
telephone calls, i.e. when individual A initiates more (less) phone calls to individual B in one 
month, their social tie will be strengthened (weakened) and individual B will make more (less) 
calls to individual A in the subsequent months.  We demonstrate the implications of our results 
in evaluating the return of temporary price promotions and designing price plans. Our results 
underscore the importance of incorporating social network characteristics in the study of 
telecommunications markets. 
Keywords: Social Network, Tie-strength, Reciprocity, Wireless Phone Service 
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A Dyad Model of Calling Behaviour with Tie Strength Dynamics 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates how consumers‟ social network characteristics affect their 
telecommunications service usage. Communication is social behaviour and telecommunications 
services must be jointly consumed by multiple people – in other words, “it takes two to tango”.  
This concept of consumption externality has been studied extensively; however, the literature has 
focused on how the network size (i.e. the number of adopters) interacts with the firms‟ product 
and pricing decisions (Shy 2001). Very little attention has been paid to the nature of consumption 
externality. In the telecommunications market, the volumes of calls are determined not only by 
the initiating but also by the receiving callers.  If a receiving caller expects little value from 
communicating with the initiating caller, the receiver can control the call volumes by either 
declining or terminating the calls.  Thus, one cannot properly understand the consumers‟ calling 
behaviour without knowing who the consumers called and their relationship. To the best of our 
knowledge, this social aspect of communication behaviour has been absent in the existing 
empirical literature which focuses on either how consumers decide service usage in response to 
the nonlinear price plans (Lambrecht and Skiera 2006; Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera 2007; 
Iyengar, Jedidi, and Kohli 2008; Huang 2008) or how consumers make service plan choices and 
usage decisions when they face uncertainty about future usage and/or service quality (Miravete 
2003; Narayanan, Chintagunta and Miravete 2007; Iyengar, Ansari, and Gupta 2007). 
Understanding the social aspect of communication behaviour is important in designing 
proper marketing and promotion policies for the telecommunications market.  Imagine that a 
firm needs to evaluate the effect of a temporary price promotion.  When the price promotion 
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applies to a grocery product such as laundry detergent in a particular geographic area, the 
promotion is expected to increase the target households‟ detergent purchases, and possibly also 
consumptions.  Usually this promotion would not affect the detergent purchases of their friends 
and acquaintances, nor would it affect the targeted households‟ perceived values for other 
grocery products. However, when the price promotion applies to the wireless service, the effect 
can be extended to the target households‟ network of social contacts.  Since the consumers 
typically pay for both the incoming and outgoing calls, the firm benefits from the increased 
communications from not only the initiating households, but also all the receivers not covered by 
the promotion. In addition, as the target households call their network of contacts more, their 
social ties would be strengthened and more future communications would be expected.  Clearly, 
a firm would underestimate the benefit of a temporary price promotion if the evaluation is 
limited only to the target households‟ consumption changes.  Understanding the social aspect of 
communication behaviour is also critical in designing social network-based price plans such as 
“friends-and-family plans” (Shi 2003), and in evaluating certain regulatory policies such as the 
“receiver-pays principle” (Jeon, Laffont, and Tirole 2004).  
We take advantage of a unique wireless communications panel dataset with detailed 
information on calling activities.  The dataset is unique because we observe who called whom at 
what time, how long each phone call lasted, the initiating callers‟ outgoing call prices, the 
receiving callers‟ incoming call prices, and the characteristics of all callers.  We develop and 
estimate a model where each pair of consumers collectively decides on both the number of calls 
and the duration of calls in each time period.  Following the tradition in social network literature, 
we consider the strength of a pair‟s social tie to be directional, dynamic, and reciprocal.  We 
postulate and empirically validate that phone calls could enhance the strengths of social ties and 
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that stronger social ties would induce more subsequent phone exchanges.  Consumers made more 
phone calls and spent most of their call volumes among those with which they had strong ties. 
Our results show that the number of common social contacts shared by a pair of consumers could 
be a good predictor for the strength of their tie.  Our results also validate the reciprocity effect, 
i.e. caller A‟s tie strength with B would increase with the number of calls A had received from B 
in the last period. Finally, we find that the outgoing prices mattered much more than the 
incoming prices on the number of calls.   
Based on our estimation results, we conduct a number of simulations to illustrate the 
marketing implications of our results. First, we show the extent of biases if one evaluates the 
effect of a temporary price promotion based on the revenue from only the outgoing or incoming 
calls but not both. Second, we show how one may underestimate the long-term benefit of a 
temporary price promotion without incorporating the reciprocity effect. Third, we show the 
implications of our results to discriminatory pricing. We find that it can be optimal to give 
consumers free incoming calls (no receiver-pay) if the receiving consumers‟ incoming prices 
play a very important role in determining the calling activities.  
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on applying social network concepts to 
marketing. Iacobucci (1996) and more recently Van den Bulte and Wuyts (2007) review the 
important relation between social networks and marketing. Recent research in marketing has 
examined other issues such as new product diffusion, commercial World Wide Web structure, 
and social commerce from a social network perspective (Van den Bulte and Joshi 2007; Katona 
and Sarvary 2008; Stephen and Toubia 2009). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
empirical study to focus on social network level consumer usage behaviour and offer marketing 
implications.   
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  We lay out the model in Section 2 and 
describe the data and empirical analysis strategy in Section 3.  We report the estimation results 
and some robustness checks in Section 4.  We present some marketing implications in Section 5.  
Finally, we conclude with main results and implications for future research in Section 6.  
 
2. Model 
In this section we develop a dyad model of calling behaviour with dynamic tie strength.  We first 
explain how we measure a pair of consumers‟ tie strength and how the tie strength evolves over 
time. We then formulate how a pair of consumers‟ calling behaviour, both the number of calls 
and number of calling minutes, depends on their tie strength and other characteristics.   
2.1 Tie Strength and the Dynamics 
In Granovetter‟s seminal work (1973), tie strength was defined as a “combination of the amount 
of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding) and reciprocal services which 
characterize the tie”. We view the tie strength between a pair of consumers as a state variable 
that indexes the closeness and intensity of these two consumers‟ social relation in all dimensions.  
Although a social tie can be multi-dimensional, in this paper we use a single-dimensional 
composite measure that acts as a surrogate for a pair‟s social relation. Our formulation of tie 
strength has four properties: directional, reciprocal, asymmetric, and dynamic.  To model these 
properties, consider a pair of individuals denoted by i and j. We use 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  to represent the strength 
of tie to individual i (with j), and 𝑠𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡  to represent the tie strength to individual j (with i) at time t. 
Thus, the tie strengths are directional. The tie strengths are asymmetric because we allow  𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  to 
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be different from 𝑠𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡 . We capture the reciprocal and dynamic properties by proposing that the tie 
strength evolves over time and the current strength of the tie depends on the past interactions. 
Specifically, we model these properties of the tie strength by assuming the following equation 
for 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 :  
𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑐1𝑛𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡−1 + 𝑐2𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝑟1𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡−1                                                                       
 (1) 
where 𝑛𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡−1 is the number of common contacts shared by individuals i and j at time t-1, 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡−1 
is the number of calls from j to i in time period t-1, and 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡−1 is the lagged tie strength in time 
period t-1. Equation (1) captures several important properties of a social tie. First, we use the 
number of common contacts in two individuals‟ personal networks as a predictor for their tie 
strength and expect a positive sign for c1. The number of common contacts measures the extent 
of overlapping between social circles, which has been used as a predictor for social closeness 
(e.g. Alba and Kadushin 1976). In a more recent study on the dynamics of email communications 
within a major university, Kossinets and Watts (2006) find that people were more likely to 
interact when they shared acquaintances. Using the number of common contacts as a predictor is 
also consistent with social networks‟ transitivity property, which proposes that a tie between 
individuals A and B and a tie between individuals B and C can often lead to a tie between 
individuals A and C (Wasserman and Faust 1994). In other words, since individuals A and C 
share the common contact with individual B, we expect a likely enhancement in the tie strength 
between A and C. Clearly, when individuals A and C share multiple common ties, we would 
expect an even stronger enhancement in their tie strength because the transitivity is multiplied.   
Second, equation (1) implies a reciprocal effect with a positive c2.  The reciprocal nature 
has been widely documented in the studies of social exchanges both in personal and business 
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settings (e.g. Blau 1965; Macaulay 1963; Granovetter 1973 and 1985).  Montgomery (1996) 
formalizes the idea of reciprocity in Blau (1965)‟s social exchange theory through a repeated 
game and demonstrates the importance of reciprocal effect in trust-building equilibrium. In this 
study we hypothesize that a person, by initiating phone calls to another, creates goodwill and 
strengthens the tie strength to the receiver. More specifically, all else equal, a larger 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡−1 (more 
phone calls from individual j to individual i in the previous period) would lead to a greater 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 , 
in other words, a stronger tie to individual i with j.  As shown later, this results in a reciprocity 
effect because individual i will make more calls to j in this time period due to a stronger tie.  
Finally, the strength of tie is expected to persist over time (e.g., Wellman, Wong, Tindall, and 
Nazer 1997; Blumstein and Kollock 1988) and thus we expect r1>0.   
The tie strength construct and its role in our calling behaviour model share some 
similarities with the brand loyalty construct and its role in brand choice models (e.g., Guadagni 
and Little 1983).  Both constructs are initiated with past purchase behaviour.  However, unlike 
the brand loyalty measure which depends solely on the past brand choices, the tie strength also 
depends on network characteristics, specifically, the number of common contacts shared by two 
people.  Second, while brand loyalty goes only one-way from consumers to brands, social tie is a 
two-way measure that allows for asymmetric strength in two directions.  Third, the strength of 
social tie is more interactive.  Specifically, each side takes stocks of other side‟s calling 
initiatives and reciprocates in the subsequent periods.  
Next we propose a cooperative game framework to derive consumers‟ calling behaviour 
as utility-maximizing outcomes.  
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2.2. Number of Calls and Calling Time: A Cooperative Game Framework  
We characterize the communication behaviour between a pair of individuals with two variables: 
the number of calls and the total calling time.  We let 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  denote the number of calls and 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  
denote the total amount of calling time that individual i made to individual j in period t.  (In 
estimation we rescale 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  to the logarithm of the total calling seconds from i to j in period t).  
We follow a cooperative game framework to derive the equilibrium calling behaviour. We adopt 
the quasi-linear utility framework in Shi (2003) and assume the following quadratic function for 
the value that individual i obtains from initiating 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  number of calls to individual j.  
𝑣𝑖(𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡) = (1 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  + 2 𝑋𝑖)  𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  - 3 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
2 - 𝑝𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑢𝑡  𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡                                               (2) 
where Xi represents individual i‟s vector of characteristics and 𝑝𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑢𝑡  is the unit price individual i 
pays for outgoing calls. We then assume individual j‟s value from receiving 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  number of calls 
from i as follows: 
𝑣𝑗 (𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡) = 1 𝑋𝑗   𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  - 2 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
2 - 𝑝𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖𝑛  𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡                                                               (3) 
where Xj represents individual j‟s vector of characteristics and 𝑝𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖𝑛  is the unit variable price 
individual j pays for the incoming calls. We expect all the parameters in equations (2) and (3) to 
be positive.  Equation (2) indicates that an individual‟s value of initiating calls increases with the 
strength of the individual‟s tie with the receiver.  The value of initiating and receiving calls also 
depends on the callers‟ characteristics. The decreasing marginal utility implied by the quadratic 
function is due to the opportunity cost of time spent in communications.  
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We assume that the equilibrium communication amount 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  is determined by two 
individuals in a cooperative fashion.
1
  Specifically, we follow the cooperative game framework 
and determine the equilibrium amount of 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  by maximizing  𝑣𝑖(𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡) + (1-) 𝑣𝑗 (𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡) where 
01 models the power of individual i in the dyad negotiation. Taking the first-order condition 
with respect to 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 , we can obtain 
𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
∗  = 
𝛼1
𝜔
 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  - 

𝜔
 𝑝𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑢𝑡  - 
(1−)
𝜔
 𝑝𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖𝑛  + 
𝛼2
𝜔
 𝑋𝑖  + 
(1−)𝛽1
𝜔
 𝑋𝑗                                     (4) 
where 𝜔 = 2 [ 3 + (1-) 2].  Adding an intercept (a0) and an error term (e1,ijt) to the above first 
order condition, and simplifying the coefficients through transformation, we obtain the 
econometric specification for the number of calls.   
𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑝𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑝𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖𝑛 + 𝑎𝑋𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝑎𝑋𝑗𝑋𝑗 + 𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡                              
(5) 
Note that the relative sizes of coefficients a2 and a3 in equation (5) reflect the sender and the 
receiver‟s power in determining the optimal communication amount.  
Next, replacing 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  with 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 , we can derive the econometric specification for the 
number of calling numbers from a same cooperative game framework. 
𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑝𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑝𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖𝑛 + 𝑏𝑋𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝑏𝑋𝑗𝑋𝑗 + 𝑒2,𝑖𝑗𝑡                                
(6) 
Equations (5) and (6) postulate that, first, the amount of communications increases with 
the strength of social tie (𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡).  The communications initiated by consumer i to j should increase 
with the strength of tie to consumer i with j. A stronger tie typically indicates a higher value for 
                                                          
1
 Jeon, Laffont, and Tirole (2004) adopt a non-cooperative framework where both individuals behave purely in self 
interests. In their model each individual chooses an amount that maximizes own value function; that is, i and j each 
decides 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  to maximize 𝑣𝑖(𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡) and 𝑣𝑗 (𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡) respectively. The equilibrium 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  will be the minimum of the two 
callers‟ optimal volumes.   
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the communications.  From equation (1), if i received more phone calls from j in the last period, 
the strength of tie with j will be strengthened to i in this period. This in turn will increase i‟s call 
to j in this time period, and then the strength of tie to j in the next period would be enhanced, so j 
will make more calls to i in the next period and so on.  Mathematically, a larger 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡−1 → a 
stronger 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  → a larger 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  → a stronger 𝑠𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡+1  → a larger 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡+1  → … This is how the 
reciprocity effect of calling arrives through the dynamic properties of tie strength.   
Equations (5) and (6) also indicate that the amount of communications depends on both 
the sender‟s outgoing calling price (𝑝𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑢𝑡 ) and the receiver‟s incoming calling price (𝑝𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑖𝑛 ).  While 
the (expected) negative effect of i‟s outgoing price on the amount of communications is standard, 
the effect of receiver j‟s incoming price on the calling amount is unique to two-sided 
communication services.  The receiver is more likely to disconnect the phone or terminate the 
call sooner when the incoming price is higher. Finally, the amount of communications depends 
on the callers‟ characteristics variables such as age and gender.  
In summary, we construct a cooperative model to derive the number and duration of calls 
as the optimal outcome that maximizes the callers‟ collective values of communications.  
Because of this, the parameters we estimate in this paper can be considered as transformed 
micro-parameters and we can conduct counterfactual experiments to examine the marketing 
implications from our model. Our model is consistent with the sociology literature that views the 
number and duration of calls as indicators for the callers‟ tie strength, and aspects of 
relationships that are related to tie strength as predictors (e.g., Marsden and Campbell 1984).   
Finally, we apply the following mean-variance structure to the error terms: 
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𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑒2,𝑖𝑗𝑡
 ~𝑁( 
0
0
 ,  
𝜎1
2 𝜌𝜎1𝜎2
𝜌𝜎1𝜎2 𝜎2
2  )                                                                            (7) 
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
Our data was collected from a large Chinese metropolitan market, where we collaborated with a 
major wireless service operator in the city.  The original data from the firm consisted of 
approximately 38,000 VIP customers – the entire membership list of the firm‟s VIP club.  The 
VIP club was essentially a loyalty program that provided status rewards such as the privilege to 
use the airport lounge services.  From this original customer-level data, we examined all the 
individual level calling records and identified 4,342 distinctive pairs of customers. Specifically, 
we select the pairs to ensure that each person in a pair has made at least one outgoing call to the 
other person, and the communication history between the pair is at least 8 months long. That is, 
the time between the first communication and the last communication is at least 240 days long. 
The selection criteria exclude the pairs with unrealized ties – pairs whose communications could 
have occurred but did not. We discuss this limitation and potential selection bias further in the 
Conclusion section.  
For the pairs identified, we aggregate the original data to form composite data on the 
monthly level.  Since all the callers were located in the same city, our analysis will focus on local 
calls only.  The pair-level communication data includes 12-month call records, from May 2003 
to April 2004.  In total we have 52,104 (4,342*12) pair-level observations.  We include the 
descriptive statistics in Table 1.  Since the tie strength in the previous month depends on the 
number of calls and the number of common contacts two months ago, we use the first two 
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months of data to construct the lagged variables of tie strength – the tie strength of the first 
month.  The data eventually used for estimation covers 10 months of activities, from July 2003 to 
April 2004, with 86,840 (4,342*2*10) individual level observations.  
Our data contains three personal characteristics variables for each caller: age, gender, and 
VIP status.  The sample includes users aged from 19 to 93.  About 25% of them were female 
customers.  The majority of customers were male customers because our sample was drawn from 
the VIP club that primarily targeted business users.  There were four levels of statuses: Diamond, 
Gold, Silver, and Value.  So Vipi is a 3-by-1 vector indicating individual i‟s VIP status in the 
calling plan.  Specifically, if i is a Gold customer, Vipi = (1, 0, 0); if i is a Value customer, Vipi 
=(0, 0, 0).  The privilege rank of the four levels of VIP status is Diamond > Gold > Silver > 
Value. In the data, the majority of individuals were Silver class (65%), followed by Value class 
(25%).  Finally, on average, each pair shared 17 common contacts in the sample.  On the 
monthly basis, each individual initiated an average of 12.5 calls with a total duration of 12.9 
minutes each.  
At the time a typical price plan consisted of a small monthly fee and a variable fee, 
possibly with some free minutes (it is more like a two-part tariff than a three-part tariff).  For 
instance, one plan charged a fixed fee of RMB (Chinese Yuan) 30.00 and RMB 0.20 for each 
minute of usage. (The exchange rate was about 8.28 RMB for each 1 US dollar in the period 
between May 2003 and April 2004.) Since our sample consists of subscribers to the same service 
provider, all the calls were within the same wireless network.  The average calling rate per 
minute was a little less than 0.20 RMB, or equivalently 0.024 $US at that time.  There are two 
main sources of price variations.  First, different consumers could subscribe to different plans.  A 
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plan with a higher fixed fee would typically correspond to a lower variable fee
2
. However, very 
few consumers changed the price plans during the observation period.  Second, the firm provided 
various forms of discounts. For example, the firm designed different types of price plans and 
sometimes offered discounts for calls between users subscribing to the same type of price plans. 
Some consumers received promotional discounts, e.g. a 20% discount on the variable fees for 
being a loyal customer for more than three years. The price variables in our data were the true 
prices consumers paid for their calls, which were the net difference between the variable prices 
and the promotional discounts.  To give an example, consider a consumer who subscribed to a 
plan with a variable fee of RMB 0.20 and received a 20% discount. Then this consumer‟s price 
would be equal to RMB 0.16 per minute.   
We jointly estimate equations (1), (5), and (6) using the standard maximum likelihood 
method to maximize the following likelihood function 
𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑎 ,𝑏𝑐 ,𝑟 ,𝜌 ,𝜎1 ,𝜎2} 𝐿 =   Pr⁡(𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 ,𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 |𝑒1, 𝑒2)𝑖 ,𝑗𝑡
                            (8)
 
where for 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 > 0 and exp 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠  > 0, the probability is
 
Pr⁡(𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 ,𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 |𝑒1, 𝑒2) = 𝑝𝑑𝑓(𝑒1 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 − 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝑒2 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 −𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡|𝜌,𝜎1,𝜎2). 
For zero observations (𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = 0 and exp 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠  = 0), as in a Tobit model, we use the 
cumulative distribution function of the normally distributed error terms to calculate the 
probability.  In our case, when the number of calls is zero, the duration of calls necessarily 
                                                          
2
 There might be an endogeneity problem here: heavy users choose plans with high fixed fees and low variable fees. 
Since we do not model consumer tariff choice, we may mistakenly attribute consumers‟ high call volumes to their 
low variable fees. We discuss this issue further in the Robustness Checks section. 
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becomes zero.  Thus, the probability can be simplified from a bivariate normal CDF to a 
univariate normal CDF 
Pr 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = 0, exp 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠  = 0 𝑒1, 𝑒2 = 𝑃𝑟 𝑒1 ≤ −𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑑𝑓 𝑒1 ≤ −𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = Φ(−𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡/𝜎1) 
The log likelihood function can be written as:  
 ln 𝑝𝑑𝑓 𝑒1 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 − 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝑒2 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 −𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 𝜌,𝜎1,𝜎2  
𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 >0
+  ln⁡[Φ(−𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡/𝜎1)]
𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 =0
 
Finally, in our setup, c1, c2 , r1 in equation (1) cannot be separately identified from a1 in 
equation (5) or b1 in equation (6).  In our actual estimation, we tried nine specifications with 
r1=0.1, 0.2, 0.3, …, 0.9.  The one with r1=0.3 gave us the best model fit, thus we normalize r1 to 
0.3 and this is an implicit condition in the results reported below. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
In this section we present the estimation results for the parameters in equations (1), (5), (6), and 
(7).  We use the observations in the first two months to construct the lagged tie strength variables 
(𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,1 and 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,2) and the observations from the 3
rd
 to 12
th
 month to estimate the parameters.  We 
have experimented with a different number of months to construct the lagged tie strength 
variables and obtained very similar results. We present the estimation results in Table 2 for 
equation (1) regarding the tie strength dynamics, in Table 3 for equation (5) regarding the 
number of months, and in Table 4 for equation (6) regarding the number of minutes of calling. 
Overall the results are very consistent with our hypotheses.  Note that we obtain our results after 
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controlling for a positive correlation between two unobserved error terms in equations (5) and (6), 
specifically, 𝜌 = 0.5188. 
4.1 Tie Strength Dynamics 
Table 2 shows the estimated results for the dynamics of tie strength.  First, the estimate for c1 is 
positive and statistically significant.  Thus, the number of overlapping ties serves as a good 
predictor for the strength of tie. This result supports the transitivity property. Although we do not 
directly observe the relationships of any two individuals, in a probabilistic sense, two individuals 
with more common contacts have a better chance of being relatives, friends, or colleagues 
(strong ties) than just acquaintances (weak ties).  The greater number of common contacts that 
two individuals share, the better they tend to know each other, the closer their relationship tends 
to be, and the stronger social tie they are likely to experience.   
Second, the estimate for c2 is positive and statistically significant. Thus, our results 
support the existence of the reciprocity effect.  Specifically, if caller A initiated more calls to 
caller B in a particular month, then in the next month caller B‟s tie strength with caller A, and 
hence caller B‟s marginal utility of calling A, would increase.  As a result, in the next month 
caller B would make more calls to caller A, possibly both in the frequency and duration of calls. 
This would then increase A‟s tie strength with B in the subsequent month and make more calls to 
B, and so on.  The prediction from this dynamic reciprocity effect in another direction is that if A 
reduces the number of calls to B in the current period, B will make fewer phone calls to A in the 
next period.  Afterwards if A does not initiate additional phone calls to B, their relationship will 
be significantly weakened in the long run.  
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4.2 Number of Calls 
Table 3 presents the results of how the number of calls depends on the tie strength, prices, and 
the callers‟ characteristics. First, the estimate for a1 is positive and statistically significant, which 
indicates that people made more phone calls to their stronger ties.  Although a large part of the 
population had access to telecommunication services, each individual consumer‟s usage was 
concentrated within a limited section of the consumer‟s social circle.  This concept is similar 
with the 80/20 rule that 80% of a firm‟s sales are derived from 20% of the firm‟s customer base. 
In personal communication, our results imply that people make most of their phone calls (“80%”) 
to a very small proportion (“20%”) of their contacts.  
Second, both the estimates for a2 
and a3 
are negative and significant.  Thus, both the 
incoming and outgoing prices matter in determining the number of calls from caller A to B.  We 
also find that the absolute value of the estimate for a2 is much larger than that for a3 with a2/a3 
=3.69.  This implies that the outgoing prices matter more than the incoming prices on the number 
of calls.  Relating to the collaborative utility framework described earlier, these results imply that 
both the initiating and the receiving caller‟s values of communications are weighed positively 
when determining the number of calls. Moreover, the higher weights are assigned to the 
initiating caller‟s value of communications. One of the implications of this result is the 
asymmetric calling behaviour between a pair of consumers.  For example, suppose caller A pays 
a higher variable price on the outgoing calls than caller B.  Given all other things being equal for 
these two consumers, caller B shall initiate more calls to A than A does to B.  As a result, B will 
have a higher outgoing/incoming call ratio than A.  While the negative effect of prices on the 
number of calls has been well documented, the literature has not distinguished the effects of 
outgoing and incoming calling prices. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that 
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empirically demonstrates the different effects of outgoing and incoming prices on the number of 
calls.  
Third, the number of calls initiated depends on the callers‟ characteristics. The results 
show that older customers made more calls but received fewer calls.  This implies that the 
outgoing/incoming call ratio was higher for the older callers. The results also show that the 
callers‟ gender matters.  Specifically, given all others the same, on average, the female customers 
made 0.80 more calls than the male customers in each month.  But the effect of gender on the 
number of receiving calls was not significant. Finally, higher VIP-status customers made more 
calls.  In terms of the number of phone calls being made, a diamond customer > a gold customer > 
a silver customer >a value customer.  On average, a diamond/gold/silver customer makes 
2.80/2.18/1.69 more phone calls in every month than a value customer, respectively. 
4.3 Number of Calling Minutes 
The results for the duration of calls are largely similar to the results for the number of calls. First, 
a positive and significant estimate for b1 indicates that people spent more minutes in calling their 
strong ties.  Thus, both the number of calls and the total calling minutes are good indicators for 
the strength of tie.  Second, both estimates for b2 and b3 are negative and significant. Thus, the 
amount of calling time was lower when the initiating caller‟s outgoing price was higher and/or 
the receiving caller‟s incoming call price was higher.  Interestingly, the absolute values of b2 and 
b3 are similar.    
Third, similar to the results on the number of calls, compared to the younger customers, 
older customers made longer calls on a monthly basis. However, the calling minutes directed to 
the older customers were lower.  Thus, the ratio of outgoing and incoming calling minutes was 
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higher among older customers than younger customers. In the market there was an 
asymmetrically large flow of phone calls initiated by older callers. Gender is another personal 
characteristic that affects the amount of calling time. Given all others the same, there were more 
calling minutes both from and to female customers, thus the female customers spent more time 
talking on the phone overall. Finally, customers with higher VIP statuses talked for longer 
durations.  Similar with the results on the number of calls, in terms of total amount of calling 
times initiated, a diamond customer > a gold customer > a silver customer > a value customer.   
4.4 Robustness Checks 
4.4.1 Add 𝒎𝒋𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 to equation (1) 
According to equation (1), 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  is a function of 𝑛𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡−1, 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡−1, and 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡−1. We do not include 
𝑚𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡−1 in equation (1) because it is highly correlated with 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡−1  - the correlation coefficient 
between the duration of calls and the number of calls is 0.8022.  As a robustness check, we add 
𝑚𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡−1 to equation (1): 
𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑐1𝑛𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡−1 + 𝑐2𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝑐3𝑚𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝑟1𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡−1                                    
 (1‟) 
We jointly estimate equations (1‟), (5), (6), and (7). The results largely remain the same and they 
are reported in Tables A1-A3 in the appendix.  
4.4.2 Allow 𝒆𝟏,𝒊𝒋𝒕, 𝒆𝟏,𝒋𝒊𝒕, 𝒆𝟐,𝒊𝒋𝒕, and 𝒆𝟐,𝒋𝒊𝒕 in equations (5) and (6) to be correlated 
In equation (7), we only allow 𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡  and 𝑒2,𝑖𝑗𝑡  (similarly, 𝑒1,𝑗𝑖𝑡  and 𝑒2,𝑗𝑖𝑡 ) to be correlated. We do 
not allow for correlation between 𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡  and 𝑒1,𝑗𝑖𝑡 , or 𝑒2,𝑖𝑗𝑡  and 𝑒2,𝑗𝑖𝑡 . In other words, we allow the 
unobserved factor in the number of calls from i to j and the unobserved factor in the duration of 
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calls from i to j to be correlated. But we do not allow the unobserved factor in the 
number/duration of calls from i to j and the unobserved factor in the number/duration of calls 
from j to i to be correlated. If there is within-dyad dependence, our estimates would be biased. 
To address this issue, we specify a more flexible error term structure: 
 
𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑒2,𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑒1,𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑒2,𝑗𝑖𝑡
 ~𝑁( 
0
0
0
0
 ,∑), ∑ =
 
 
 
𝜎1
2 𝜌12𝜎1𝜎2
𝜌12𝜎1𝜎2 𝜎2
2    
𝜌13𝜎1𝜎3 𝜌14𝜎1𝜎4
𝜌23𝜎2𝜎3 𝜌24𝜎2𝜎4
𝜌13𝜎1𝜎3 𝜌23𝜎2𝜎3
𝜌14𝜎1𝜎4 𝜌24𝜎2𝜎4
   
𝜎3
2 𝜌34𝜎3𝜎4
𝜌34𝜎3𝜎4 𝜎4
2
 
 
 
                   (7‟) 
The estimation becomes more difficult with the new error term structure because now the main 
model is a multivariate Tobit model.  Depending on whether 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠>0 and 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠>0, our likelihood 
function takes four different forms: 
1. 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠>0, 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠>0  
This is the simplest case. We can use the PDF of a multivariate normal distribution to define the 
likelihood: 
Pr 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 ,𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 , 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 ,𝑚𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠  𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑒2,𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑒1,𝑗𝑖𝑡 , 𝑒2,𝑗𝑖𝑡 ) 
= 𝑝𝑑𝑓(𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 − 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝑒2,𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 −𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝑒1,𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 − 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡 , 𝑒2,𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 −𝑚𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡|∑). 
2. 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠>0, 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠=0 
The likelihood can be defined sequentially: the probability of observing 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠>0 times the 
probability of observing 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠=0 conditional on 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠>0. 
Pr 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 ,𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 , 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 ,𝑚𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠  𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑒2,𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑒1,𝑗𝑖𝑡 , 𝑒2,𝑗𝑖𝑡 ) 
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= Pr 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 ,𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 , 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = 0 𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑒2,𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑒1,𝑗𝑖𝑡 ) 
= 𝑝𝑑𝑓 𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 − 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝑒2,𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 −𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 Σ1,2  
∗ Pr⁡(𝑒1,𝑗𝑖𝑡 ≤ −𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡|𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 − 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝑒2,𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 −𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 , Σ12,3), 
where Pr 𝑒1,𝑗𝑖𝑡 ≤ −𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡 𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 − 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝑒2,𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 −𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝜇12,3,𝜎12,3  
=  𝑐𝑑𝑓 −𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡 𝜇12,3,𝜎12,3 = Φ(−𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 − 𝜇12,3/𝜎12,3), 
Σ1,2 = (
𝜎1
2 𝜌12𝜎1𝜎2
𝜌12𝜎1𝜎2 𝜎2
2 ), 
𝜇12,3 =  𝜌13𝜎1𝜎3,𝜌23𝜎2𝜎3 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣 Σ1,2 ∗ [𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 − 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 ,𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 −𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡]′, 
𝜎12,3 = 𝜎3 −  𝜌13𝜎1𝜎3,𝜌23𝜎2𝜎3 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣 Σ1,2 ∗  𝜌13𝜎1𝜎3,𝜌23𝜎2𝜎3 ′. 
3. 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠=0, 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠>0 
Case 3 is similar to case 2. We omit the equations to avoid repetition. 
4. 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠=0, 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠=0 
Pr 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 ,𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 , 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 ,𝑚𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠  𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑒2,𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑒1,𝑗𝑖𝑡 , 𝑒2,𝑗𝑖𝑡 ) 
= Pr 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = 0, 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑜𝑏𝑠 = 0 Σ1,3) = 𝑃𝑟 𝑒1,𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≤ −𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝑒1,𝑗𝑖𝑡 ≤ −𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡|Σ1,3 , 
where Σ1,3 = (
𝜎1
2 𝜌13𝜎1𝜎3
𝜌13𝜎1𝜎3 𝜎3
2 ) 
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The probability is given by a bivariate normal CDF, which cannot be directly obtained. 
We simulate bivariate normal distributions via the GHK simulator to calculate the probability for 
this case. Thus our estimation method becomes simulated maximum likelihood. 
We jointly estimate equations (1‟), (5), (6), and (7‟). The results are reported in Tables 
A4-A6 in the appendix. The qualitative properties of the results are largely the same. We do find 
significant and positive correlations between the unobserved factors within a dyad (all pho‟s are 
significant and positive). 
4.4.3 Add individual-level fixed effects to the duration of calls regression 
Our model may suffer an endogeneity problem because the heavy users could choose plans with 
high fixed fees and low variable fees in order to save the total cost. As a result, we may 
mistakenly attribute consumers‟ high call volumes to their low variable fees without modeling 
consumer tariff choice. In other words, consumers may not be responding to price promotions; 
the negative correlation between price and calling volume could be an outcome of endogenous 
tariff choice. To at least partially address this issue, we estimate one fixed-effect model with the 
caller as the panel variable, and another fixed-effect model with the receiver as the panel 
variable
3
. By eliminating unobserved individual heterogeneity (including the cross-sectional 
variation on price plan selection), we can test, conditional on the price plan chosen, whether 
consumers are indeed sensitive to price changes.  
The results are reported in Tables A7-A8 in the appendix. After we add fixed effects to 
callers, the outgoing call price coefficient remains significant and negative. Interestingly, the 
incoming call price coefficient becomes insignificant. These results indicate that the caller is 
                                                          
3
 We did not add fixed effects at the pair level because the price plan is chosen by individuals after considering all 
their social contacts. The price plan choice is not a dyad-level decision. 
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indeed responsive to the outgoing call price, but may not know or care too much about the 
receiver‟s incoming call price. Similarly, after we add fixed effects to receivers, the incoming 
call price coefficient is significant and negative, while the outgoing call price coefficient 
becomes insignificant. These results imply that the receiver is sensitive to the incoming call price, 
but may not know or care about the caller‟s outgoing call price. These results combined seem to 
support the assumption that the pair level calling decision is a joint decision made by both the 
initiating caller and the receiver, while the caller mainly cares about the outgoing call price and 
the receiver mainly cares about the incoming call price. The fixed-effect model results also show 
that consumers are responsive to price changes - the negative correlation between price and 
calling volume is not simply driven by endogenous tariff choice
4
. 
5. Marketing Implications 
Our main estimation results are obtained from equations (5) and (6). As we have demonstrated in 
section 2, these demand equations are essentially the equilibrium conditions in a utility 
maximization model. Thus the parameters being estimated are transformed micro-parameters. 
The structural nature of the model allows us to conduct counterfactual experiments to evaluate 
the marketing implications, specifically in measuring the return of temporary price promotions 
and in designing the profit-maximizing price plans. 
 
 
                                                          
4 Nevertheless, we cannot add fixed effects to our main empirical specification for two reasons. First, our empirical 
specification is derived from a collaborative utility framework. The model coefficients have clear economic 
meanings and we need them to calculate firm revenues and do counter-factual experiments. Adding fixed effects 
would make it difficult to interpret the meanings of model coefficients. Second, our model is a simultaneous 
equation model. Technically, we could not add fixed effects to equation (1) because 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  is not directly observed. 
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5.1 Evaluate the Return of a Temporary Price Promotion: Outgoing and Incoming Calls 
In the introduction section, we described one important distinction between the grocery product 
market and the wireless service market: while a price promotion on laundry detergents can affect 
only the target households‟ purchase decisions, a price promotion on wireless phone service 
would increase not only the target households‟ outgoing calls but also the resulting incoming 
calls of their social contacts.  When consumers need to pay for incoming calls, a wireless service 
provider would underestimate the return of a price promotion if limiting its attention only to the 
target households‟ outgoing calls and ignoring the domino effect on the incoming calls of their 
networks.  
To demonstrate how much revenue would be overlooked if one focuses on only the 
outgoing calls, we conduct the following counterfactual experiments based on the estimation 
results given in Tables 2-4.  Consider a one-time price promotion applied to all of our panel 
consumers‟ outgoing call prices in month 3.  We first calculate the total revenue changes in 
months 3-12 from both the outgoing calls and the incoming calls predicted by our model 
[equations (1), (5), and (6)].  We then calculate the revenue changes in months 3-12 from the 
outgoing calls only.  Taking the difference between these two amounts of revenue changes, we 
can obtain the magnitude of overlooked revenues.  We provide in Table 5 the detailed results 
corresponding to different levels of price promotions.  For example, with a 90% promotion on 
the outgoing call price while keeping the incoming call price unchanged, we could miss the 
revenue of $431.23 from the increased incoming calls if focusing only on the outgoing calls. 
Similarly, we estimate how much revenue would be overlooked if we focus on consumers‟ 
incoming calls only.  Again, consider a one-time price promotion applied to all of our consumers‟ 
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incoming call prices in month 3.  We first calculate the total revenue changes in months 3-12 
from both the outgoing calls and the incoming calls predicted by our model.  We then calculate 
the revenue changes in months 3-12 from the incoming calls only.  Taking the difference 
between these two amounts of changes, we obtain the magnitude of overlooked revenue.  We 
provide the detailed results in Table 6 for different levels of promotions. For example, for a 90% 
promotion on the incoming call price while keeping the outgoing call price unchanged, we would 
miss the revenue of $274.72 from the increased outgoing calls if we ignore the revenue from the 
outgoing calls.  
Clearly the counterfactual exercises demonstrate that a firm could underestimate the 
effect of a temporary price promotion if the firm focuses on only the service under promotion 
(e.g. the outgoing calls).  The nature of joint consumption implies that the price promotion also 
affects the consumption of the service not under promotion (e.g. the incoming calls). In this 
counterfactual exercise we include the entire sample for the hypothetical price promotion. The 
overlooked revenue is expected to be much more substantial if the temporary price promotion 
covers only a subset of the sample.      
5.2 Evaluate the Long-Term Return of a Temporary Price Promotion: the Reciprocity Effect 
As explained in section 2, there is a reciprocity effect in people‟s calling decisions according to 
equation (1).  If a firm offers a temporary price promotion, the reciprocal effect is expected to 
increase the firm‟s total revenues in the subsequent time periods. Specifically, for a pair of 
individuals i and j, if the firm runs a price promotion in time t-1 on j‟s outgoing call price or i‟s 
incoming call price, j would call i more (reflected by larger 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡−1 and 𝑚𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡−1) in 𝑡 − 1.  Then, 
larger 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡−1 → stronger 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  → larger 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡  → stronger 𝑠𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡+1 → larger 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,𝑡+1 → … 
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To demonstrate the implications of this reciprocity effect, we consider a one-time price 
promotion offered in month 3. We first calculate the total revenue from months 3-12 predicted 
by our model, and we then calculate the total revenue predicted by a benchmark model without 
the dynamic reciprocity effect.  In the benchmark model, the promotion only affects the 
consumers‟ calling behaviour in month 3 and there is no carry-over effect.  We compute the total 
revenue differences for different levels of price discounts and present the results in Table 7.  The 
total revenue would be generally underestimated by several hundred dollars if we ignore the 
dynamic reciprocity effect.  For example, for a 50% promotion on both the outgoing call price 
and the incoming call price, the promotional effect on the total revenues in months 4-12 would 
be underestimated by $384.17 if we ignore the reciprocity effect. 
The reciprocity effect underlines a new source of long-term effects for a price promotion. 
In the packaged goods market, a price promotion may also have long-term effects on sales 
through repeat purchases. Such long-term effects are typically driven by the changes in the 
consumers‟ brand awareness and loyalty and switching costs (e.g., Blattberg, Briesch, and Fox 
1995). In contrast, what changes with the reciprocity effect is consumers‟ relationship with their 
social contacts, not their relationship with the brands. The long-term sales effect resulting from 
the reciprocity factor is realized through the nature of consumption externality and the dynamic 
aspect of reciprocity.     
5.3 Optimal 2-sided Pay Scheme: Incoming Call and Outgoing Call Prices 
Our model has useful implications to the optimal design of 2-sided pay schemes with different 
prices on the incoming and outgoing calls.  The incoming calls are typically free for the fixed-
line phones but are often charged like the outgoing calls for the wireless phones. Analytical 
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research has been conducted to study the welfare implications of the “receiver-pay principle” 
(e.g., Jeon, Laffont, and Tirole 2004).  To illustrate the implications of our model to the design of 
pricing plans, we conduct two simulation exercises. First, we search for the optimal 3
rd
-period 
prices that maximize the firm‟s revenue from the sample consumers. We consider a set of price 
deviations from the actual outgoing call and incoming call prices in the 3
rd
 month.  Based on the 
results in Tables 2-4, we simulate the effects of these price changes on the total revenue from the 
entire sample in months 3-12.  Figure 1 displays the predicted total revenue as a function of the 
outgoing call price change and incoming call price change.  The revenue-maximizing prices are 
positive and higher than the actual prices for both the incoming and outgoing calls. There are two 
possible explanations for this result. First, our model does not consider the competition between 
service providers. Second, our sample consists of only the VIP customers who were not very 
price sensitive. The optimal prices would be lower if we had more low-volume customers who 
tended to be more price-sensitive.   
Second, in order to search for situations where a firm may provide free incoming calls we 
increase the coefficients of the outgoing call prices (𝑎2 and 𝑏2) by 400% and the coefficients of 
the incoming call prices (𝑎3  and 𝑏3 ) by 900%. As illustrated by Figure 2, the shape of the 
revenue function became completely different from the one in Figure 1.  Now the optimal pricing 
strategy to maximize revenues from months 3-12 would be to increase the outgoing call prices 
by 82.74% while reducing the incoming call prices by 100% (numbers obtained through 
numerical optimization), which would essentially give customers free incoming calls. 
Interestingly, as the receiver‟s incoming call price becomes sufficiently important in determining 
the number of calls, the “no receiver-pay” principle could be optimal.  When the consumers 
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really care about the receiving callers‟ prices, giving consumers free incoming calls could cause 
them to call each other more often and this will bring firms higher revenues.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates consumers‟ calling behaviour from the social network perspective.  We 
employ a unique wireless communication panel dataset with detailed information on who called 
who, the number and duration of calls, the incoming and outgoing prices for each call, and the 
callers‟ personal characteristics.  We propose an economic framework for how consumers decide 
their calling activities in a collaborative fashion to maximize the weighted average of two callers‟ 
value of communications. We derive and estimate a model for the number and the duration of 
calls between a pair of consumers with dynamic tie strength. Our empirical results validate that, 
first, the tie strength increased with the number of common contacts. Second, people initiated 
more calls and spent more time talking to their strong ties. Third, the reciprocal effect existed in 
this market. Specifically, consumer (A)‟s tie strength with another consumer (B) increased with 
the number of calls A received from B in the previous period. A stronger social tie would in turn 
prompt consumer B to call A more often subsequently. We also find that the outgoing prices 
mattered much more than the incoming prices on the number of calls. Thus, the initiating caller‟s 
value function weighed more than the receiving caller‟s value function in determining the 
number of calls. Based on our estimation results, we use simulations to illustrate the marketing 
implications in evaluating the effect of a temporal price promotion and in designing service price 
plans. We find that the absence of the social network perspective could lead to an 
underestimation of both short-term and long-term returns of a price promotion. We also find that 
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when the receiving consumers‟ value of communications enjoys a large weight in determining 
the calling activities, firms may find it optimal to offer free incoming calls - the no-receiver pay 
principle. 
Our paper is subject to a potential sample selection problem. The sample we selected in 
this paper might be biased because we did not include those unrealized ties – ties where 
communications could have potentially occurred but did not. There are three reasons why we did 
not correct the selection bias. First, our network has 38,000 nodes and hence 1,444/2 million 
pairs of customers. It is technically not feasible to deal with such a large sample. Second, 
although it is theoretically possible that any two consumers can be connected, in reality each 
consumer lives in a small circle and communicates with a very small number of people. The ties 
between most of those 1,442/2 pairs would never be realized. Third, previous research shows 
that only focusing on realized ties does not substantially reduce statistical power (e.g., Coslett, 
1981; Imbens, 1992; Sorenson and Stuart, 2008). Fourth, the main focus of our paper is to show 
that it is important to incorporate social network characteristics in the study of 
telecommunications markets. We do not intend to generalize our quantitative results to other 
cases. To some extent one could consider our study focusing on heavy users only. Finally, 
generalizing to the entire population does not have much practical value because the firm earns 
its revenues primarily from the heavy users – the pairs with frequent conversations. Any social 
network-based marketing schemes would target only these pairs with strong ties. 
Our paper provides the first empirical study incorporating social network characteristics 
in modeling consumer‟s economic behaviour.  Future research may extend the framework from 
the dyad level to multiple-player networks.  This extension would allow a model to capture 
additional properties of network dynamics. Another direction of future research is to study the 
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relation between all the ties connected to one individual consumer. This extension would 
facilitate a better understanding of how a consumer substitutes communications from one contact 
to another.  
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Table 1 Two-sided Descriptive Statistics (Number of pair-level observations = 52,104) 
 Side 1 Side 2 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of outgoing calls 12.531 20.026 0 312 12.489 20.874 0 612 
Minutes of outgoing calls 12.857 26.875 0 1301.9 12.886 27.680 0 913.1 
Unit outgoing price  
(Chinese cent/minute) 
19.310 9.094 0 60 19.108 8.876 0 60 
Unit incoming price 
(Chinese cent/minute) 
19.094 9.272 0 60 18.909 9.029 0 60 
Caller age 37.974 7.378 19 93 37.862 7.074 19 82 
Caller gender (female) 0.249 0.432 0 1 0.2655 0.441 0 1 
Vip G (value) 0.247 0.431 0 1 0.257 0.437 0 1 
Vip J (gold) 0.090 0.287 0 1 0.089 0.286 0 1 
Vip Y (silver) 0.650 0.477 0 1 0.642 0.479 0 1 
Vip Z (diamond) 0.012 0.110 0 1 0.012 0.108 0 1 
Number of overlap contacts 17.152 14.739 0 165     
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Table 2 Estimation Results for Tie Strength Dynamics (𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡) 
 
Parameter Variable Parameter estimate Standard error z-value 
𝑐1 
Number of overlapping ties 
(Lag 1 month) 
0.0567 0.0019 29.7553 
𝑐2 
Number of Incoming calls 
(Lag 1 month) 
0.2605 0.0014 182.8011 
𝑟1 Tie strength (Lag 1 month) 0.3 n.a. n.a. 
Bold: significant at 5% level; +: significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 3 Estimation Results for Number of Calls from i to j 
 
Parameter Variable Parameter estimate Standard error z-value 
𝑎0 Intercept -3.6556 0.4764 7.6729 
𝑎1 Tie_strengthij 1.8913 0.0068 279.5763 
𝑎2 i‟s unit outgoing price -0.0579 0.0069 8.3908 
𝑎3 j‟s unit incoming price -0.0157 0.0067 2.3262 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s age 0.1134 0.0088 12.8862 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s age -0.0392 0.0084 4.6678 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s gender (female) 0.7993 0.1594 5.0149 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s gender (female) 0.1191 0.1452 0.8205 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s VIP status_J 2.1845 0.2517 8.6806 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s VIP status_Y 1.6880 0.1469 11.4873 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s VIP status_Z 2.8000 0.5705 4.9077 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s VIP status_J -1.2401 0.236 5.2542 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s VIP status_Y -0.0806 0.1427 0.5646 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s VIP status_Z -4.0823 0.5759 7.0891 
     
𝜌
 
 0.5188 0.003 174.1659 
𝜎1 
 16.8361 0.0447 376.7899 
σ2  1.2885 0.0032 403.0172 
-Log(Likelihood)  434,582.7   
Bold: significant at 5% level; +: significant at 10% level 
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Table 4 Estimation Results for Minutes of Calls from i to j 
 
Parameter Variable Parameter estimate Standard error z-value 
𝑏0 Intercept 4.9112 0.0351 139.8514 
𝑏1 Tie_strengthij 0.0893 0.0005 182.1042 
𝑏2 i‟s unit outgoing price -0.0026 0.0005 4.8145 
𝑏3 j‟s unit incoming price -0.0032 0.0005 5.9564 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s age 0.0062 0.0007 9.1275 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s age -0.0030 0.0007 4.246 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s gender (female) 0.0911 0.0126 7.2559 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s gender (female) 0.0777 0.0116 6.7177 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s VIP status_J 0.2879 0.0204 14.0979 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s VIP status_Y 0.2089 0.0114 18.3197 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s VIP status_ Z 0.3308 0.0465 7.1183 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s VIP status_J 0.0661 0.0191 3.4615 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s VIP status_Y 0.0721 0.0122 5.922 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s VIP status_Z -0.2042 0.0464 4.3994 
Bold: significant at 5% level; +: significant at 10% level 
 
  
 
 
33 
 
Table 5 Overlooked Revenues from the Increased Incoming Calls* 
percent1\percent2
**
 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 
-0.9 293.68 309.93 325.94 341.70 357.21 372.49 387.53 402.31 416.88 431.23 
-0.8 260.75 275.15 289.34 303.27 317.03 330.57 343.90 357.02 369.94 382.66 
-0.7 227.86 240.43 252.81 264.99 276.99 288.81 300.44 311.89 323.16 334.25 
-0.6 195.09 205.83 216.41 226.82 237.07 247.17 257.11 266.90 276.53 286.01 
-0.5 162.38 171.31 180.10 188.75 197.27 205.66 213.92 222.05 230.06 237.94 
-0.4 129.76 136.88 143.89 150.79 157.59 164.28 170.87 177.35 183.74 190.03 
-0.3 97.21 102.53 107.77 112.94 118.02 123.02 127.95 132.80 137.58 142.28 
-0.2 64.73 68.27 71.75 75.19 78.56 81.89 85.17 88.39 91.57 94.69 
-0.1 32.33 34.09 35.83 37.54 39.23 40.88 42.52 44.12 45.71 47.26 
* This table measures the overlooked revenues from the increased incoming calls due to a 
temporary price promotion on the outgoing calls in month 3. The revenues could be overlooked 
if examining only the type of calls (outgoing calls) on promotion. It is computed in dollars and 
calculated as the total revenue change from the increased incoming calls in months 3-12 due to a 
one-time price promotion on the outgoing call price in month 3 (percent 1), at different levels of 
the incoming call prices in month 3 (percent 2).  For example, with the incoming call price same 
as actual (percent2=0), for a 90% discount on the outgoing call price (percent1=-0.9), there 
would be $431.23 revenue increase due to the increased incoming calls. This is the amount that 
would be overlooked if one ignores the revenues from the incoming calls when evaluating the 
return of the temporary price promotion in month 3. For another example, consider a 50% 
discount on the outgoing call price (percent1=-0.5) and set the incoming call price as low as 50% 
of actual price (percent2=-0.5). The increased revenue from the incoming calls would be $197.27; 
again this would be the overlooked revenue if one focuses on only the outgoing calls when 
evaluating the return of the price promotion.  
 
**
New outgoing call price = actual outgoing call price×(1+percent1) 
   New incoming call price = actual incoming call price×(1+percent2) 
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Table 6 Overlooked Revenue from the Increased Outgoing Calls * 
percent1\percent2 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 
-0.9 94.89 84.27 73.66 63.08 52.52 41.99 31.47 20.92 10.45 
-0.8 115.83 102.81 89.82 76.82 63.91 51.05 38.23 25.45 12.70 
-0.7 136.47 121.07 105.73 90.46 75.24 60.08 44.97 29.92 14.93 
-0.6 156.92 139.18 121.52 103.94 86.43 68.99 51.63 34.35 17.14 
-0.5 177.14 157.08 137.12 117.26 97.49 77.81 58.22 38.72 19.32 
-0.4 197.12 174.77 152.54 130.43 108.42 86.52 64.73 43.05 21.47 
-0.3 216.86 192.26 167.78 143.44 119.22 95.13 71.16 47.32 23.60 
-0.2 236.38 209.54 182.85 156.30 129.90 103.64 77.52 51.54 25.70 
-0.1 255.66 226.61 197.73 169.01 140.45 112.04 83.80 55.71 27.78 
0 274.72 243.49 212.44 181.57 150.87 120.35 90.01 59.83 29.83 
* This table measures the overlooked revenues from the increased outgoing calls due to a 
temporary price promotion on the incoming calls in month 3. The revenues could be overlooked 
if examining only the type of calls (incoming calls) on promotion. It is computed in dollars and 
calculated as the total revenue change from the increased outgoing calls in months 3-12 due to a 
one-time price promotion on the incoming call price in month 3 (percent 2), at different levels of 
the outgoing call prices in month 3 (percent 1).  For example, with the outgoing call price same 
as actual (percent1=0), for a 90% discount on the incoming call price (percent2=-0.9), there 
would be $274.72 revenue increase due to the increased outgoing calls. This is the amount that 
would be overlooked if one ignores the revenues from the outgoing calls when evaluating the 
return of the temporary price promotion in month 3. For another example, consider a 50% 
discount on the incoming call price (percent2=-0.5) and set the outgoing call price as low as 50% 
of actual price (percent1=-0.5). The increased revenue from the outgoing calls would be $97.49; 
again this would be the overlooked revenue if one focuses on only the incoming calls when 
evaluating the return of the price promotion on the incoming calls.  
 
**
New outgoing call price = actual outgoing call price×(1+percent1) 
   New incoming call price = actual incoming call price×(1+percent2) 
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Table 7 Revenue Difference Due to Reciprocity Effect
*
 
percent1\percent2
**
 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 
-0.9 695.10 679.03 662.96 646.90 630.85 614.81 598.77 582.66 566.64 
-0.8 
633.15 617.10 601.06 584.94 568.92 552.91 536.91 520.91 504.93 
-0.7 571.22 555.21 539.20 523.20 507.21 491.23 475.26 459.30 443.34 
-0.6 
509.51 493.53 477.56 461.59 445.63 429.68 413.74 397.81 381.88 
-0.5 447.93 431.98 416.04 400.10 384.17 368.26 352.35 336.44 320.55 
-0.4 
386.48 370.56 354.64 338.74 322.84 306.95 291.07 275.20 259.34 
-0.3 
325.15 309.26 293.37 277.50 261.63 245.78 229.93 214.09 198.25 
-0.2 263.94 248.08 232.23 216.38 200.55 184.72 168.90 153.09 137.29 
-0.1 
202.86 187.03 171.21 155.39 139.59 123.79 108.00 92.22 76.45 
* This table measures the difference in revenue from a temporary price promotion in month 3 
due to the reciprocity effect.  The revenue difference is measured in dollars and calculated as the 
difference between the total revenues from months 3-12 as predicted by two different models: 
the model with reciprocity effect as estimated in the paper and the model without reciprocity 
effect (i.e., 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,4  does not change despite a larger 𝑞𝑗𝑖 ,3 ). For example, consider a 50% price 
discount for both the outgoing call price and the incoming call price (percent1=-0.5, percent2=-
0.5). The table shows that the reciprocity effect would lead to an additional revenue increase of 
$384.17 due to more phone exchanges after month 3. 
 
** New outgoing call price = actual outgoing call price*(1+percent1) 
     New incoming call price = actual incoming call price*(1+percent2) 
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Figure 1 Total Revenues from Months 3-12 as a Function of Price Changes in Month 3 
(Measured in Dollars with Price Sensitivities Based on Actual Data) 
 
 
 
 
*New outgoing call price = actual outgoing call price×(1+percent1) 
  New incoming call price = actual incoming call price×(1+percent2) 
 
  
Total Revenue 
Percent1 
Percent2 
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Figure 2 Total Revenues from Months 3-12 as a Function of Price Changes in Month 3 
(Measured in Dollars and Hypothetical Price Sensitivities)* 
 
 
 
 
*New outgoing call price = actual outgoing call price*(1+percent1) 
  New incoming call price = actual incoming call price*(1+percent2) 
  Price sensitivities: the coefficients of the outgoing call prices (𝑎2 and 𝑏2) increased by 400% 
and the coefficients of the incoming call prices (𝑎3 and 𝑏3) increased by 900%. 
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Percent1 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Estimation Results for Tie Strength Dynamics (𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡) 
Parameter Variable Parameter estimate Standard error z-value 
𝑐1 
Number of overlapping ties 
(Lag 1 month) 
0.0438 0.0019 23.6077 
𝑐2 
Number of Incoming calls 
(Lag 1 month) 
0.2358 0.0018 129.5259 
𝑐3 
Duration of Incoming calls 
(Lag 1 month) 
0.7115 0.0143 49.8474 
     
𝑟1 Tie strength (Lag 1 month) 0.3 n.a. n.a. 
Bold: significant at 5% level; +: significant at 10% level 
 
Table A2 Estimation Results for Number of Calls from i to j 
Parameter Variable Parameter estimate Standard error z-value 
𝑎0 Intercept -9.6831 0.4866 19.8977 
𝑎1 Tie_strengthij 1.7611 0.006 291.6353 
𝑎2 i‟s unit outgoing price -0.0564 0.0076 7.3739 
𝑎3 j‟s unit incoming price -0.0127+ 0.0074 1.7044 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s age 0.1064 0.0093 11.4265 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s age -0.0555 0.0089 6.2472 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s gender (female) 0.8028 0.1504 5.3367 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s gender (female) 0.2136 0.1497 1.4269 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s VIP status_J 2.1813 0.2575 8.4701 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s VIP status_Y 1.5915 0.1512 10.5291 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s VIP status_Z 3.3381 0.5988 5.5746 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s VIP status_J -1.405 0.2535 5.5422 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s VIP status_Y -0.2547+ 0.1505 1.6922 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s VIP status_Z -3.897 0.614 6.3472 
     
𝜌  0.4936 0.0031 158.7762 
𝜎1  16.8414 0.0468 359.8871 
𝜎2  1.2568 0.0035 362.6856 
-Log(Likelihood)  433,452.0   
Bold: significant at 5% level; +: significant at 10% level 
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Table A3 Estimation Results for Minutes of Calls from i to j 
 
Parameter Variable Parameter estimate Standard error z-value 
𝑏0 Intercept 4.5605 0.0355 128.4946 
𝑏1 Tie_strengthij 0.0896 0.0005 176.6817 
𝑏2 i‟s unit outgoing price -0.0022 0.0005 4.0005 
𝑏3 j‟s unit incoming price -0.0026 0.0006 4.7541 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s age 0.0060 0.0007 8.3904 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s age -0.0039 0.0007 5.8066 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s gender (female) 0.0854 0.0123 6.9543 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s gender (female) 0.0755 0.0122 6.1823 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s VIP status_J 0.2778 0.0208 13.3391 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s VIP status_Y 0.1976 0.0125 15.7506 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s VIP status_ Z 0.3559 0.049 7.2594 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s VIP status_J 0.0421 0.0203 2.0687 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s VIP status_Y 0.0539 0.0127 4.2334 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s VIP status_Z -0.2098 0.0502 4.1774 
Bold: significant at 5% level; +: significant at 10% level 
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Table A4 Estimation Results for Tie Strength Dynamics (𝑠𝑖𝑗 ,𝑡) 
Parameter Variable Parameter estimate Standard error z-value 
𝑐1 
Number of overlapping ties 
(Lag 1 month) 
0.1203 0.0015 80.9931 
𝑐2 
Number of Incoming calls 
(Lag 1 month) 
0.8181 0.0412 19.8511 
𝑐3 
Duration of Incoming calls 
(Lag 1 month) 
0.5345 0.042 12.7374 
     
𝑟1 Tie strength (Lag 1 month) 0.3 n.a. n.a. 
Bold: significant at 5% level; +: significant at 10% level 
 
Table A5 Estimation Results for Number of Calls from i to j 
Parameter Variable Parameter estimate Standard error z-value 
𝑎0 Intercept -0.4046 0.4714 0.8583 
𝑎1 Tie_strengthij 0.5475 0.0277 19.7556 
𝑎2 i‟s unit outgoing price -0.043 0.007 6.1204 
𝑎3 j‟s unit incoming price -0.0209 0.0069 3.0219 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s age 0.0788 0.0083 9.5342 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s age -0.0444 0.0083 5.373 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s gender (female) 0.331 0.1337 2.4762 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s gender (female) 0.1243 0.1335 0.9306 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s VIP status_J 0.3112 0.2244 1.3869 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s VIP status_Y 0.472 0.1368 3.451 
𝑎𝑋  i‟s VIP status_Z 0.133 0.5247 0.2535 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s VIP status_J -0.1493 0.2242 0.6658 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s VIP status_Y 0.1976 0.1367 1.4454 
𝑎𝑋  j‟s VIP status_Z -0.0908 0.5307 0.1711 
     
σ1  16.426 0.0614 267.7194 
σ2  1.3599 0.0051 266.7344 
σ3  17.7133 0.0623 284.2122 
σ4  1.3659 0.0051 266.0362 
pho12  0.526 0.0038 139.4965 
pho13  0.0383 0.007 5.5008 
pho23  0.2569 0.004 64.6383 
pho14  0.0655 0.0045 14.7055 
pho24  0.4551 0.0041 111.4464 
pho34  0.5668 0.0034 167.9006 
-Log(Likelihood)  431,795.9   
Bold: significant at 5% level; +: significant at 10% level 
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Table A6 Estimation Results for Minutes of Calls from i to j 
 
Parameter Variable Parameter estimate Standard error z-value 
𝑏0 Intercept 4.9748 0.0445 111.7566 
𝑏1 Tie_strengthij 0.0238 0.0012 19.8139 
𝑏2 i‟s unit outgoing price -0.0034 0.0005 6.0992 
𝑏3 j‟s unit incoming price -0.0038 0.0005 7.0241 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s age 0.0057 0.0007 8.5715 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s age -0.0025 0.0007 3.7135 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s gender (female) 0.0724 0.0112 6.4721 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s gender (female) 0.0762 0.0112 6.8157 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s VIP status_J 0.2445 0.0185 13.2107 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s VIP status_Y 0.176 0.0114 15.5025 
𝑏𝑋  i‟s VIP status_ Z 0.2929 0.0448 6.5415 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s VIP status_J 0.116 0.0185 6.2559 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s VIP status_Y 0.0897 0.0114 7.8978 
𝑏𝑋  j‟s VIP status_Z -0.0791+ 0.0449 1.7605 
Bold: significant at 5% level; +: significant at 10% level 
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Table A7 Fixed-Effect Model for Minutes of Calls from i to j (Panel Variable: Caller i*) 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t 
i‟s unit outgoing price -2.249 0.839 2.68 
j‟s unit incoming price -1.031 0.659 1.56 
Number of overlapping ties 
(Lag 1 month) 
30.888 0.390 79.17 
j‟s age -6.587 0.958 6.87 
j‟s gender (female) 150.386 14.435 10.42 
j‟s VIP status_J 74.493 20.086 3.71 
j‟s VIP status_Y 42.626 13.333 3.2 
j‟s VIP status_Z -149.241 43.560 3.43 
Intercept 484.081 41.552 11.65 
    
R-sq (within) 0.0703 
  
R-sq (between) 0.0461 
  
R-sq (overall) 0.0498 
  
Number of obs 95524 
  
Number of groups 5475 
  
Bold: significant at 5% level; +: significant at 10% level 
* fixed effects added to caller i 
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Table A8 Fixed-Effect Model for Minutes of Calls from i to j (Panel Variable: Receiver j*) 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t 
i‟s unit outgoing price -0.041 0.725 -0.06 
j‟s unit incoming price -1.602+ 0.852 -1.88 
Number of overlapping ties 
(Lag 1 month) 
31.530 0.416 75.77 
i‟s age 0.961 1.023 0.94 
i‟s gender (female) 195.878 15.404 12.72 
i‟s VIP status_J 199.971 21.428 9.33 
i‟s VIP status_Y 116.523 14.230 8.19 
i‟s VIP status_Z 31.069 46.481 0.67 
Intercept 82.435+ 44.162 1.87 
 
   
R-sq (within) 0.0652 
  
R-sq (between) 0.0562 
  
R-sq (overall) 0.0515 
  
Number of obs 95524 
  
Number of groups 5475 
  
Bold: significant at 5% level; +: significant at 10% level 
* fixed effects added to receiver j 
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